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There is a short experience of administering unemployment benefit systems in Central 
and Eastern Europe. Income support for people searching for work did not exist prior to 
the 1990s due to an absence of open unemployment in planned economies.  The debate 
about the behavioural impact of the new benefit systems in the region has been 
considerable but has focused on benefit levels and lengths of entitlements.
1 We look at 
the neglected issue of the administration of benefits. We use data from a field 
experiment with random assignment to treatment and control groups conducted in 
Hungary in 2003. Evidence from field experiments on monitoring job search behaviour 
by the unemployed is thin on the ground throughout Europe. And to our knowledge, 
there is no evidence at all for countries from Central and Eastern Europe.
2
  Hungary was the first former planned economy to introduce unemployment 
benefit. In the early 1990s administration focused on benefit delivery as the economy 
contracted sharply. There has been concern that the monitoring of job search activity of 
benefit recipients may be weak (a concern fuelled in part by the perceived importance of 
the hidden economy). The sustained recovery of the Hungarian economy from the mid-
1990s, and hence the greater availability of jobs, prompts further consideration of the 
issue. Our work provides the first analysis of monitoring of job search by the Hungarian 
unemployed and of their frequency of contact with benefit administrators. 
Section 2 uses Labour Force Survey data, administrative registers and our own 
enquiries into employment office practices to shed light on monitoring of job search by 
benefit claimants in Hungary. We make comparisons with other OECD countries where 
possible. Monitoring in Hungary is typically light and has declined in recent years. This 
provides the background for our experiment, the design of which is explained in Section 
3.  The results in Section 4 show marked differences between the sexes in the effect of 
treatment on benefit duration and outflows to employment. The treatment has quite a 
large positive effect on women aged 30 and over while we find no effect for younger 
women or for men. Section 5 concludes. 
 
                                                 
1 See Boeri and Terrell (2002) for a summary. Examples include Ham et al (1998) for the Czech Republic 
and Slovakia, and Micklewright and Nagy (1999) for Hungary. 
2 The small European literature includes the early work by Royston (1983, 1984) and Dolton and O’Neill 
(1995) for the UK and Gorter and Kalb (1996) and van den Berg and van der Klaauw (2001) for the 
Netherlands. Evidence is much more common in the US e.g. Ashenfelter et al (2005), Black et al (2002) 
and the survey by Meyer (1995). 
 22.  Job search monitoring: Hungary and other OECD countries 
 
The administration of unemployment benefit can be thought of as attempting to restrict 
benefit to people who are unemployed in the sense of the standard ILO definition 
(OECD 2000, p130): out of work, able to enter work at short notice and undertaking 
active steps to find work.  Table 1 summarises the degree of success of the Hungarian 
benefit system in achieving this aim, showing the proportion of unemployment benefit 
recipients who are classified in Labour Force Survey (LFS) data as unemployed by the 
ILO criteria. The figure of two-thirds in 1993 was low to average compared to those for 
other Central European countries (Bardasi et al 2001). And it has fallen substantially 
since, to less than a half by 2002. To take another yardstick, this is well below the figure 
of 75 percent or more found throughout the period in the UK, a country that has 
tightened its administration of benefit considerably (and where unemployment moved in 
a similar way to that in Hungary over the years in question).
3
  Women with unemployment benefit are less likely to be available and searching 
for work than men.  This is also true of other Central European countries in the Bardasi 
et al comparisons (and of the UK), and a gender difference in behaviour turns out to be 
a key feature of results from our experiment. The difference in search and availability 
rates is even larger in most years between persons receiving contributory (and limited 
duration) unemployment insurance (UI) and those on means-tested social benefit (SB) 
provided by local government councils. (The latter can be paid where a person has 
insufficient contributions for UI or has exhausted entitlement.) Persons on SB are much 
less likely to be in the labour force. But it is clear that the fall in search and availability 
rates over time has occurred for claimants of both benefits. (SB and UI have been of 
roughly equal importance in terms of the benefit claimant stock since 1996.) The 
empirical literature on monitoring search in other countries tends to focus on UI. For 
practical reasons explained below, the same is true of our experiment, although we say 
what we can about SB in the rest of this section. 
  Restricting benefit to just the ILO unemployed can be tried through various 
forms of monitoring by the public employment service. One method is to require 
claimants to report periodically for face-to-face interviews in which information is 
sought on their job search activity (and is also provided on possible opportunities). 
                                                 
3 UK figures are derived from LFS microdata for the years shown in Table 1. Unemployment rates in 
Hungary and the UK were 12.1 and 10.5 percent respectively in 1993 and 5.2 and 3.1 percent in 2002. 
 3Figure 1 shows the proportion of the registered Hungarian unemployed who had visited 
a public employment office in the previous month, again based on LFS data. (The data 
are limited to 1999-2002 as the relevant question was not asked in earlier years.) The 
offices are responsible for both administration of benefits and for matching of the 
unemployed to suitable registered vacancies. The figure is again much lower for 
claimants on SB (and similar to that for people receiving no benefit at all): only 1 in 3 
recipients in 2002 had been to the employment office in the previous month.  But even 
for UI recipients the figure was little more than one half. 
  Face-to-face interviews are just one form of monitoring that can be used by a 
public employment service. For example, interviews are rare in many US states, which 
instead rely more on postal or phone reports by claimants of job search activity, with 
continued benefit conditional on satisfactory information being given (Andersen 2001). 
However, Hungary has very little of such other monitoring, underlining the importance 
of face-to-face interviews. For this reason, the sharp fall in 2000 in the proportion of 
claimants with recent visits to local employment offices is certainly noteworthy.  This 
fall coincided with new legislation that required UI claimants to visit employment 
offices at least once every three months. Existing law had not stipulated any period, 
merely saying that visits should occur ‘regularly’, and their frequency had been left to 
employment office discretion. Far from tightening benefit administration as had been 
intended, the effect of the change in law seems to have been that many offices which 
had previously required more frequent visits took the three month period as the standard 
(a conclusion borne out by our discussions with employment office staff). 
  The evidence therefore suggests that administration of unemployment benefits in 
Hungary has weakened in recent years. This has been a period when one might have 
expected it to strengthen on account of an easing of labour market conditions and a 
growing economy. Against this background we now briefly outline aspects of the 
existing system in more detail that are relevant to our experiment.
4
  Industrialised countries differ substantially in the measures they undertake to 
monitor search and availability of benefit claimants. However, some common features 
can be identified (OECD 2000). Like most other Continental European countries (and 
unlike the US and the UK for example), Hungary does not require frequent reporting of 
                                                 
4 It should be noted that there has also been a large fall in the proportion of the ILO unemployed stock 
who receive any benefits, from 59 percent in 1993 to only 35 percent in 2002 (with the UI coverage rate 
falling from 52 percent to 18 percent). This is not evidence that administration has tightened. The main 
explanation for the fall has been sharp cuts in entitlement periods to UI. 
 4independent job search activity. In fact no such reporting is required. UI claimants must 
register with their local employment office and must then return regularly in person to 
continue to declare their availability, as noted earlier. But no records need be kept by 
the claimant of employers he or she has contacted or of other efforts to find a job and no 
checks are made of search activity during visits to the employment office.
5  In the past, 
all unemployed SB claimants also had to report regularly to an employment office but 
whether or not they are required to do so is now at the discretion of each local 
government (and no information exists on the range of different practices). 
  The frequency at which the UI claimant must return to the employment office 
differs across the country, illustrating a feature found in many other countries’ 
monitoring activity: substantial within-country variation (OECD 2000). The Hungarian 
public employment service is organised by counties, of which there are 20. Each county 
has considerable discretion to interpret the relevant legislation as it sees fit. Practice 
varies from office to office within the counties as well. We collected information on 
office practices in Autumn 2002 from 28 offices (out of a national total of 170) spread 
over the six counties in which our field experiment was to be conducted. The counties 
were picked in part to provide a good spread of labour market conditions (see Section 
3).  Of these, 16 required that UI recipients returned every three months. In six offices 
the frequency was once a month and in the remaining six somewhere in between.
6 In 
addition, in all offices claimants could be contacted within this interval and asked to 
attend in person to receive information on a specific vacancy that the office deemed 
suitable. 
  This variation in administrative practices seems to be reflected in LFS data on 
the proportion of UI recipients in each county who have visited an employment office in 
the last month, although these data should also reflect regional variation in claimants’ 
search behaviour (if the offices’ vacancy lists are seen as worth consulting). Figure 2 
shows that the 2003 figures ranged from about 40 percent to over 70 percent. (The much 
lower figures for SB recipients, not shown, are well correlated with those for UI 
claimants.) 
                                                 
5 The US represents an extreme contrast. Most states require UI claimants to report at least two employer 
contacts per week. (In the mid-1990s the director of the Hungarian county of Somozgy introduced a 
system in all offices whereby claimants had to get a form stamped by employers to certificate that a job 
had been applied for. The system lasted for about a year.) 
6 The precise interval may vary from that reported to us since claimants sometimes contact the office in 
advance and succeed in changing the stipulated date (on what may be reasonable grounds or may be 
suspect grounds). 
 5  Monitoring of any type will only be effective if there is a credible threat of 
sanctions in the case that a claimant does not comply with a request to come to the 
employment office, to provide information on job search behaviour, to follow-up on a 
suggested vacancy etc. Sanctions for on-going UI claims will typically involve 
suspension of payments or outright disqualification. In Hungary, missing an interview 
with the employment office is the classic explanation for the former while the latter is 
typically triggered by unreasonable refusal of a job offer generated through the local 
employment office or by behaviour that resulted in no offer being made (e.g. arriving 
drunk at an interview with an employer).
7  
  Sanction rates in practice for the six counties covered by our experiment are 
shown in Figure 3. The data refer to all suspensions and disqualifications that are 
applied to on-going UI claims and are expressed in terms of the annualised number as a 
percent of the average UI stock. We compare them with rates defined on the same basis 
for other OECD countries, figures that vary greatly. And once more, there is substantial 
regional variation within Hungary. The county with the highest rate, Vas, is sanctioning 
claims at the same broad level as Australia and the Czech Republic, which are among 
the tougher OECD countries in the table, although nowhere near as tough as 
Switzerland or the US.  Szolnok is at a similar level to the UK, Norway and Finland, 
while Csongrad and Komaron at the other end of the range are more akin to Belgium 
and Denmark. Of course, higher rates may reflect more frequent behaviour in need of 
sanction rather than a stricter application of the rules. But in the case of Hungary we 
think the latter to be the case. This leads us to expect that the impact of treatment in our 
experiment may vary geographically due to differences in the culture of sanctioning.
8
  The final background to our experiment is a major change in UI legislation that 
occurred in 2003 which provides for both an extension to UI and a re-employment 
bonus. Claimants with at least 180 days of entitlement (the maximum is 270 days), 
something generated by a good employment history, are now given the option three 
months before the expiry of their entitlement to ‘co-operate actively’ with the local 
employment office in return for a flat-rate extension to their entitlement for six months 
beyond the normal expiry date (the main UI scheme pays an earning-related benefit). If 
they obtain a job during this six month extension period and hold it until the end of the 
                                                 
7 Suspension of benefit is usually until the claimant finally comes to the office. For second and 
subsequent offenses, the period of suspension uses up the claimant’s entitlement period. 
8 Note that there is variation within counties by employment office; about half the variation in sanction 
rates across employment offices is at this level rather than between counties. 
 6period, they are given half the value of the saving in UI payments. In principle, ‘active 
co-operation’ involves more frequent visits to the employment office and undertaking 
specific job search activity chosen by the office. About half the UI inflow has an 
employment history that would qualify them for this extension. 
  This innovation may have been inspired by examples from the US, both of UI 
extension schemes and re-employment bonuses. But it was introduced with no analysis 
of the likely take-up or impact (for which no data are yet available). And the definition 
in practice of the required ‘active co-operation’ is unclear. However, the new scheme 
does at least underline that the Hungarian benefit authorities are beginning to think 
more about job search monitoring, which provides further motivation for our 
experiment. 
 
3.  The experiment 
 
Claimant behaviour suggested by LFS data and the current monitoring practices in 
Hungary had several implications for the experiment’s design.
9
First, the main instrument of monitoring in use at present is the requirement on 
the claimant to report regularly to the local employment office. Policy here appears to 
have inadvertently relaxed in recent years and an obvious choice was to explore its 
tightening. Second, since offices rarely ask about job search activity (and never formally 
monitor it), questioning claimants on this subject was again an obvious measure to 
experiment with. Third, although the SB scheme seems in considerable need of 
attention, we restricted the experiment to UI claimants. The organisation of SB by local 
governments meant there was no central authority with whom participation in the 
experiment could be agreed. Fourth, the existing variation across the country in 
monitoring practices implied that we had to be careful to standardise monitoring of the 
control group of claimants in the experiment as well as the group assigned to treatment. 
Finally, LFS data show women to be less likely to search and be available for work than 
men and we therefore wanted to cover both sexes in the experiment. 
To add to this background, we had to recognise that office clerks overseen by 
their managers would be the persons actually administering the treatment. The culture 
of only light monitoring in the UI system affected what could be tried without risking a 
                                                 
9 The experiment was planned by us in conjunction with the National Labour Centre. It was then adopted 
as a formal initiative of the Centre. 
 7significant principal-agent problem: an experiment has to be ‘doable’ in the sense of 
allowing agents to carry it out conscientiously. (It must also be ‘doable’ in the legal 
sense, with the experimental treatment being permitted by law.) 
Our experiment was therefore modest. Successful UI claimants were divided 
into treatment and control groups at the outset of their claims with their spells of UI 
administered as follows for the duration of the experiment: 
 
Control:  Visit the employment office every three months and face no questions on 
job search. 
 
Treatment:   Visit the employment office every three weeks and office clerks ask 
detailed questions on job search behaviour since the last visit. 
 
Sanctions for failure to come to an interview remained as before (including any local 
variation in practices suggested in Section 2).  The questions on job search information 
began to be asked of the treatment group at their first scheduled return to the office three 
weeks after initial registration for UI. These questions concerned methods of search 
undertaken since the last visit, numbers of contacts with employers, names and locations 
of up to three employers who were contacted, and reasons for lack of employer contact 
if none had taken place. 
  What effects do we hypothesise the treatment to have? More frequent contact 
with the employment office maintains the claimant’s exposure to a major source of 
vacancies, underlines the link between receiving benefits and looking for work and 
disrupts any activity in the hidden economy thus decreasing its attraction relative to 
formal jobs.  The questioning during visits again reinforces the benefit-search link and 
produces disutility for people who have to admit to little or no search activity. Although 
no formal sanctions were in fact applied to those who reported no search (the usual 
sanctions did apply if the three weekly interview was missed), claimants would have 
been uncertain as to the implications of failure or repeated failure to search.
10  These 
effects of the treatment should result in a greater level of search activity and 
consequently a higher exit rate to jobs from the UI register. Exits to inactivity could also 
increase (where individuals decline to search but decide to cease claiming benefit). 
                                                 
10  Even claimants who had been recently unemployed would not have perfect knowledge of current 
regulations and office practices. 
 8  The experiment began in late April 2003. It covered all new UI claimants with 
75-179 days of UI entitlement who registered in the following three months in six 
counties.
11 Information on marital status, household composition and circumstances 
(e.g. number of children of different ages, employment status of the spouse) was 
obtained from all claimants at initial registration for UI.  The experiment lasted for 4½ 
months, implying that claimants in the treatment group made a maximum of 4 requested 
visits at three-weekly intervals to the employment office (after the initial visit for 
registration for UI). At the end of the experiment, each participating local office 
reverted to its previous practice of administering claims in progress, visits being 
requested of claimants at a frequency of anything between 1 and 3 months and with no 
questions on job search asked at these visits.  
Claimants were allocated to treatment or control groups on the basis of their 
birthdays – odd days to treatment, even days to control – which amounts to random 
assignment.  Participants were unaware of the existence of the experiment. In principle, 
individuals in the two groups could have talked to each other and discovering that their 
claims were being administered in different ways. However, in practice we think this 
very unlikely other than in perhaps a few isolated cases. The bulk of claimants were 
dealt with by employment offices in reasonable sized settlements where few claimants 
would know each other.  All offices were changing their practices for a large group of 
claimants not covered by the experiment – see below – so variation in treatment within 
the same office should not have been cause for surprise.
12
  The restriction of the experiment to those with less than 180 days of entitlement 
was made in order to avoid persons eligible for the 2003 extended UI scheme described 
in the last section. This scheme offers an additional period of benefit and a re-
employment bonus in return for vaguely specified additional job search activity.  All 
aspects of the scheme’s workings, including take-up and administration, were unknown 
at the time our experiment went into the field and we judged it sensible to exclude those 
eligible for it. The drawback of this decision is that the experiment was restricted to a 
group with a rather specific employment history: claimants with 75-179 days of 
entitlement have between 1 and 2½ years of insured employment in the four years prior 
to their claim. They have either had periods out of work, for example due to previous 
                                                 
11 We excluded persons above the age of 50 on account of their proximity to retirement age. 
12 To the extent that any contamination between treatment and control groups did occur, our estimates 
should provide a lower bound on the impact of the changes in the administrative procedures concerned. 
 9unemployment, or have joined the labour force during this time. About two thirds of 
those aged 30 and over (of either sex) have had a previous spell of UI during the four 
years and somewhat less than half of those under 30.  
  The six counties covered by the experiment contained a total of 48 employment 
offices (28 of which were included in our investigation of office practices described in 
the previous section). These six were chosen out of the total of 20 partly so as to give a 
mix of labour market conditions and existing rigour in application of eligibility rules 
and partly because they were counties with employment service mangers who we 
believed would oversee the experiment in an appropriate manner.
13  The conduct of the 
experiment was monitored by county managers and by the National Labour Centre with 
input from us. 
  After cleaning the data, the sample for analysis was composed of 2,134 persons 
(1,115 treatment and 1,019 control), split almost equally between men and women. The 
appendix shows the composition of treatment and control groups in terms of observed 
characteristics (other than outcome variables). No differences between the two groups 
are significant at the 5 percent level.
14
  The outcomes of the treatment that we can observe are (a) time registered as 
unemployed as measured by duration of time on UI (and hence censored if UI 
entitlement exhausts) and (b) exit state (job, training scheme, death etc) if the spell 
finishes.
15 The latter is in principle an important advance over data that measure only 
the duration of claims (e.g. Royston 1983, 1984) since treatment might encourage exit 
from the labour force entirely rather than to work. We do not observe wages in post-
unemployment jobs. The effects of treatment on exits to jobs are hypothesised to come 
through greater search activity and any reduction in the reservation wage that comes 
from the disutility of increased monitoring. Note that treatment could stimulate more 
job search without any impact on exits from UI. The additional search may not be 
sufficient to generate job offers, due to weak local labour demand or because it is 
merely token activity. 
                                                 
13 This consideration seems also to have influenced selection of employment offices in the Dutch 
experiment analysed in ven den Berg and ven der Klaauw (2001) which was restricted to two offices with 
‘a good reputation for carrying out counselling and monitoring activities in a highly orderly fashion’. 
14 We also tested for differences with four sub-samples: women aged less than 30, women 30 and over, 
men aged less than 30, and men 30 and over. Again, no significant differences were found other than for 
marital status among men aged over 30 (71 percent married in the control group and 62 percent married 
in the treatment group.) 
15 The effect of treatment is measured conditional on a UI claim being made. Changes to benefit 
administration could also change the propensity to make a claim. 
 10 
4. Results 
 
Table 2 shows the exit states from the UI register for treatment and control groups. 
More than two thirds of spells of unemployment are censored, either due to the ending 
of the period of the experiment or because the individual exhausted entitlement to UI.
16 
There are only small differences between the distribution of the two groups across other 
states. Notably, there is a difference of only one point between the percentages leaving 
the register to get a job (a difference that is not significant) and there is virtually no 
difference in the very low percentages voluntarily ceasing their claims to UI (who 
presumably exit to inactivity or to hidden economy jobs). This impression of no impact 
from the treatment is strengthened by Figure 4 where we show Kaplan-Meier estimates 
of survival in the UI register. A small difference can be observed between the treatment 
and control groups after 60 days, with the treatment group leaving the register slightly 
more quickly, but a log rank test shows no significant differences between the two 
survival functions. 
However, the picture changes when we disaggregate by gender and age. Results 
are summarised in Table 3. The first column shows the log-rank tests for differences in 
the survivor function between treatment and control groups, distinguishing between 
men and women and between persons aged 30 and over and those who are younger. 
There are still no significant differences for the men. But among the women aged over 
30 the survivor functions differ significantly at the 10 percent level. Columns 2-4 show 
the extent of this difference – a quarter of the control group have exited after 102 days 
in the register but among the treatment group a quarter have gone by only 85 days.  
(Among younger women an apparently perverse result if found, with those in the 
control group leaving more quickly, but the difference in survival functions is 
completely insignificant.) Figures 5 and 6 show respectively the survivor function for 
the women aged over 30 and their (smoothed) hazard for exits to jobs, by far and away 
the most important exit state. Differences between the treatment and control groups 
emerge after about one month, at about the time when the experiment begins to bite.
17
                                                 
16 This reflects the low outflow rate from unemployment in Hungary and other Central European 
countries (Boeri and Terrell 2002, Micklewright Nagy 1999). 
17 30 percent of women of this age in the treatment group leave to jobs compared to 23 percent of the 
control group, which may be compared with the figures for all men and women in Table 2. 
 11We now estimate multivariate models of the exit to jobs hazard, including a 
dummy for membership of the treatment group. Why estimate these models given that 
membership of the treatment group is independent of individual and locality 
characteristics by design? First, the models allow us to compare the effect of the 
treatment with the effect of other characteristics, which therefore provide a yardstick. 
Second, they are convenient way for exploring whether the treatment effect varies with 
other characteristics to those explored in the earlier graphical analysis, i.e. whether there 
are interaction effects. That said, the relatively small sample sizes at our disposal and 
the high degree of censoring means it is difficult to estimate interaction effects with any 
precision. 
We estimate a model for the hazard, h, of individual i registered in employment 
office e leaving unemployment at duration s and real time t, of the following form: 
 
  hiest = g(s).f(Ti , Xi , Oe , Zt) 
 
where Ti is a dummy for membership of the treatment group, Xi are other observed 
characteristics we control for, Oe  are a vector of employment office dummies, and Zt 
pick up real time effects. We model g, the base-line hazard, with a (exponential) 
function of a series of dummy variables for each two-week interval that turn on an off as 
the individual moves through a spell of unemployment (following the practice of Meyer 
1990). The function f is specified as: 
 
f(Ti, Xi , Oe , Zt) = exp(αTi + βXi + γOe + δZt). 
 
This includes dummy variables for real time, Zt, namely months of the year, allowing 
the hazard to change directly with calendar time as well as duration (claimants enter the 
register over a three month period).  The employment office dummies, Oe, pick up 
fixed-effects associated with the strength of local labour demand or aspects of the 
employment office itself, such as the skills of the staff in matching the unemployed to 
vacancies. The impact of the treatment is assumed constant: it is not allowed to change 
with duration, s, or calendar time, t.  This may seem inappropriate given the evidence of 
Figure 6. However, we estimate the model having first left-truncated the spell data so 
that we only model the hazard in the period following the initial interview at the 
employment office. Up to that point, individuals in the treatment group are not 
 12administered any ‘treatment’ (they are asked to return to the office sooner than the 
control group only at that interview). With the left-truncated data, there is a rough 
constant difference between the empirical hazards (estimated by the Kaplan-Meier 
method) for treatment and control groups for women aged 30 and over, justifying our 
imposition of an unchanging impact of the treatment in the parametric modelling. 
Parameter estimates are reported in Table 4 in the form of hazard ratios. (The 
clustering of individuals in employment offices is taken into account in the calculation 
of standard errors.)  For dummy variables, these estimates show the ratio of the hazard 
with the dummy turned on to that when it is turned off. In the case of age (entered 
continuously), it shows the proportional change of the hazard with a change of one year 
of age. We estimate models separately for women aged under 30, for women aged 30 or 
over, and for men. For reasons of space, we do not report the coefficients of the base-
line duration dummies, the calendar month dummies, or the nearly 50 employment 
office dummies. 
The estimated impact of the treatment for men and for younger women is, as in 
the earlier graphical analysis, insignificantly different from zero. However, for women 
aged 30+, we estimate the hazard to be 60 percent greater for the treatment group, 
ceteris paribus. This difference is significant at the one percent level.
18
The other coefficients are often insignificant for all three groups. This is true of 
age, marital status, spouse’s employment status, and number of children aged 0-6 (there 
is some indication that the hazard declines with age for younger women). Education is 
surprisingly insignificant for men and for women it is only the college/university 
educated where there is a clear increase in the hazard over the base group of 
primary/less than primary. 
Tables 5 and 6 test for variation of the treatment effect with individual and local 
characteristics. Table 5 investigates whether the impact of treatment differs for married 
people (marital status itself has no association with the hazard in Table 4). For the 
women aged 30 and over the data suggests that this is indeed the case, the hazard ratio 
for married women being 90 percent higher for the treatment group while for single 
women treatment has essentially no impact. An increased level of claim monitoring 
appears to stimulate married women of this age to search more successively but not 
                                                 
18 In a model without the employment office fixed effects the hazard ratio for treatment for the women 
aged 30+ is 1.43 with a t-statistic of 2.2. The employment office fixed effects are significant in each 
model in Table 4 at the five percent level but not at the one percent level (LR test with 47 degrees of 
freedom). 
 13single women. However, some caution is needed since the hypothesis that the effect is 
the same for the two groups, single and married, is only just rejected at the 10 percent 
level. For younger women and for men, treatment again has no significant impact, 
regardless of marital status. 
Table 6 shows whether the effect of treatment varies with the level of local 
unemployment. Where labour demand is lower (as measured by higher unemployment), 
treatment may increase search behaviour but have less impact on exits to work. Or 
offices may administer the treatment less rigorously in areas where jobs are in short 
supply. We investigate this by interacting the treatment dummy with the employment 
office area unemployment rate. The rate is measured at March 2003 and is not allowed 
to vary with calendar time, t. This means that we cannot include the employment office 
dummies as well – all the impact of the employment office fixed effects is being forced 
into the local unemployment rate. Table 6 shows the results of models that include both 
the local unemployment rate and its interaction with the treatment group dummy. In the 
case of women aged over 30, there is some (weakly determined) evidence in favour of 
the hypothesis that the treatment has less effect where unemployment is higher: the 
coefficient on the treatment dummy remains significant at the one percent level and the 
interaction with the unemployment rate is just significant at the five percent level. The 
hazard for a woman in the treatment group in an area with a 3½ percent unemployment 
rate is 2.02 times higher that for a woman in the control group in the same area (or 
another with the same unemployment rate).
19 This falls to 1.46 at a 5½ percent 
unemployment rate and to 0.82 at 9 percent unemployment. (These rates are about the 
bottom decile, median and top decile levels faced by the sample.) On the other hand, the 
unemployment rate itself is completely insignificant.
20
 
5. Conclusions 
 
We have investigated a neglected issue in analysis of unemployment benefit systems in 
Central and Eastern Europe – their administration. Evidence from LFS data on changes 
in search behaviour over time and on geographical variation suggest strongly that this is 
                                                 
19 Given that we report hazard ratios in Table 6, this calculation is obtained as follows: 2.02 = 
3.56*(0.85
3.5). 
20 We also estimated a model in which the employment office effects were forced through a variable 
indicating the level of sanctions applied by each office, with this variable then interacted with the 
treatment dummy. However, we found no evidence that treatment had a larger effect in offices with a 
record of more frequently sanctioning claims. 
 14an issue worth considering in Hungary. We focus on claimants receiving UI but the 
limited evidence to hand on means-tested assistance benefit shows that search behaviour 
and contact with the employment service may be even more important to consider for 
recipients of this form of income support. 
We assessed the impact of changing the administration of UI with a randomized 
control trial which may be the first field experiment of this type in Central and Eastern 
Europe.  The modest changes we were able to investigate – involving more frequent 
visits to local employment offices and questions about job search activity – had an 
effect only for women aged over 30. This effect was appreciable (although not very well 
determined) and appears higher for married than single women. 
Finally, we emphasize that the impact of benefit administration on search behaviour 
is far from being the only issue of concern surrounding unemployment benefit in 
Hungary today.  Not only has the proportion of benefit recipients who are ILO/OECD 
unemployed fallen over time but the proportion of ILO/OECD unemployed who receive 
any benefit (UI or assistance benefit) has also fallen considerably. Both aspects of the 
benefit system need attention. 
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Appendix. Characteristics of the treatment and control groups of UI claimants 
 
Variable  Treatment group Control group 
Female, %  51.8  50.9 
Age, average  32.7  32.6 
   Educational level, %    
primary or less  30.4  30.7 
vocational   34.7  35.6 
vocational secondary  18.8  19.3 
general secondary   10.0  8.3 
college or university  6.1  6.1 
   Household variables    
Married, %  50.7  53.5 
Spouse employed, %  31.4  34.0 
Children aged 0-3, av. no.  0.08  0.08 
Children aged 4-6, av. no.  0.13  0.11 
Children aged 7-10, av. no.  0.18  0.18 
Children aged 11-14, av. no.  0.15  0.17 
Employed persons, av. no  0.77  0.78 
Pensioners, av. no  0.28  0.28 
Women receiving childcare 
allowance, av. no  0.09 0.09 
    
Number of observations  1,113  1,019 
 
 
Note: no differences between treatment and control groups are significant at the 5% 
level. (Differences in educational level are investigated with a single chi-squared test 
with five d.f.) 
 
 
 
 17Table 1. Percentage of recipients of unemployment benefit who are classified as 
unemployed according to the ILO definition: 
 
  1993 1996 1999 2002 
Unemployment Insurance (UI)  69  63  54  55 
Social Benefit (SB)  52  54  48  39 
Men  71 64 54 48 
Women  60 51 47 42 
All  benefit  recipients  67 58 51 45 
 
Source: Labour Force Survey microdata 
Note: UI is a contributory benefit of fixed term duration. SB is a means-tested benefit 
restricted to those exhausting UI entitlement. 
 
 
Table 2. Exits states from UI register 
 
Exit state  Treatment group  
(%) 
Control group 
(%) 
Re-employment 23.9  22.8 
Training   2.2  2.0 
Other active measure  1.8  2.2 
Disqualification 2.1  1.3 
Claim ceased voluntarily  1.0  0.7 
Other reason  0.4  0.4 
Censored by UI exhaustion  46.3  44.5 
Censored by experiment ending  22.5  26.3 
Total 100.0  100.0 
No. of observations  1,113  1,019 
 
 
 
Table 3. Log rank test of difference in survivor functions between treatment and 
control groups 
 
 
Sample 
size 
Log-rank test   Duration (days) at survival 
probability of 0.75 
   p-value  Control Treatment    Difference
Men aged less than 30  503  0.312  98  95  3 
Men aged 30 or older  534  0.578  105  105  0 
Women aged less than 30  479  0.947  88  93  -5 
Women aged 30 or over  615  0.076  102  85  17 
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Table 4. Model of the re-employment hazard (hazard ratios) 
 
   Women 
   <30 years  30-49 years  Men 
Treatment group  0.92  1.60  0.93 
   (0.37)  (2.67)  (0.56) 
Age 0.92  1.01  1.00 
   (1.74)  (0.32)  (0.51) 
Married 0.79  1.19  1.27 
   (0.41)  (0.59)  (1.07) 
Spouse employed  1.29  1.07  0.78 
   (0.50)  (0.26)  (1.09) 
No. of children aged 0-6  0.78  0.76  1.28 
   (0.84)  (1.05)  (1.65) 
Vocational school  1.39  0.95  1.20 
   (1.15)  (0.26)  (0.83) 
Vocational secondary school  1.36  0.64  1.28 
 (0.67)  (1.42)  (1.04) 
General secondary school  1.57  0.96  1.01 
 (1.26)  (0.11)  (0.02) 
College, university  4.25  2.46  1.75 
   (3.30)  (3.09)  (1.69) 
  
No. of observations  479  615  1037 
 
Note: absolute values of t statistics in parentheses are from the test that the hazard ratio 
is equal to 1.0. Coefficients for the base-line hazard (dummy variables for different time 
intervals), the employment office dummies, and month dummies for calendar time are 
not reported. Standard errors take account of clustering of individuals in local 
employment offices. 
 
 19Table 5. Interactions for marital status (hazard ratios) 
 
   Women 
   <30 years  30-49 years  Men 
Treatment group*Married  0.69  1.89  0.82 
   (0.95)  (2.96)  (1.15) 
Treatment group*Single  1.05  1.09  1.07 
   (0.2)  (0.32)  (0.24) 
Married dummy  0.98  0.86  1.44 
 (0.04)  (0.52)  (1.50) 
      
No. of observations  479  615  1037 
 
 
Note: The model is as in Table 4 with the addition of the interactions of the treatment 
dummy with marital status; absolute values of t statistics in parentheses are from the test 
that the hazard ratio is equal to 1.0. 
 
 
 
 
Table 6. Interactions for local unemployment rate (hazard ratios) 
 
 
   Women 
   <30 years  30-49 years  Men 
Treatment group*local unemp. rate (%) 1.13  0.85  1.04 
 (1.03)  (1.97)  (0.80) 
Local unemployment rate (%)  0.94  1.03  1.06 
 (0.43)  (0.71)  (1.38) 
Treatment group dummy  0.48  3.56  0.74 
 (1.08)  (2.61)  (0.77) 
      
No. of observations  479  615  1037 
 
 
Note: The model is as in Table 4 with the addition of the local unemployment rate and 
its interaction with the treatment dummy and with the exclusion of local office fixed 
effects; absolute values of t statistics in parentheses are from the test that the hazard 
ratio is equal to 1.0. 
 
 20Figure 1. Percentage of registered unemployed visiting an employment office 
within the last month 
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Source: Labour Force Survey microdata.  
Note: UI is Unemployment Insurance, SB is Social Benefit. 
 
 21Figure 2. Percentage of UI recipients visiting an employment office within last 
month by county, 2003 
 
0 20 40 60 80 100
percent
Vas
Békés
Zala
Veszprém
Bács-K.
Győr-S.
Nógrád
Csongrád
Szolnok
Hajdú-B.
Borsod
Komárom
Szabolcs
Heves
Pest
Somogy
Tolna
Baranya
Budapest
Fejér
 
 
Source: Labour Force Survey microdata.  
 22Figure 3. Sanctions and disqualifications of unemployment benefit for behaviour 
during claim (yearly figures) per 1000 persons in claimant stock 
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Source: Figures for Hungary are for 28 of the 40 employment offices included in the 
experiment described in Section 3. Figures for other countries are from OECD (2000 
Table 4.2). 
Note: Figures refer only to sanctions and disqualification applied during a period of 
unemployment to successful claims for benefit (loss of benefit due to voluntary quitting 
is not included). Hungarian figures refer to UI claimants only. 
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Figure 4. Survival in UI register, all men and women 
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 24Figure 5. Survival in UI register, women aged 30 or over 
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Figure 6. Hazard to exit to employment, women aged 30 or over 
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